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CHILD CUSTODY: EVOLUTION OF CURRENT
CRITERIA
Donald C. Schiller*
With the elimination of the presumption in favor of the
mother, courts are left with "the best interest of the child" as
the sole criterion in contested child custody cases. In this Arti-
cle, Mr. Schiller describes several methods courts have begun to
utilize to obtain the information necessary to determine which
parent should be awarded custody. Due to a lack of precedent
establishing any particular procedure, and in view of recent leg-
islation by various states, the author concludes that legislation
should be enacted to create a defined procedure which will more
adequately inform the court and better serve "the best interest
of the child."
INTRODUCTION
In divorce proceedings, the most difficult problems that courts
and lawyers encounter are contested custody issues. Dollar values
for support and property interests can be dealt with in concrete
terms, using traceable objective criterion. On the other hand,
decisions affecting custody of children necessarily are based on
far more elusive and subjective factors. A custody decision by a
court is one of the few types of judicial decisions which will in
effect regulate the day to day life of a human being for an indefi-
nite period of time. Such a decision, depending on the age of the
child, will probably shape that child's personality for the rest of
his life. Despite the agony a judge must experience in making
decisions of this magnitude, the courts nevertheless must step
forward and accept this Solomon-like task' when parents are un-
able to solve this problem for themselves. It is the purpose of this
Article to delineate the methods used in child custody determina-
tions. Possible improvements of the current methods that are still
in an embryonic stage of development also will be discussed.
* Partner, Schiller & Schiller. Chairman of Chicago Bar Association's Matrimonial Law
Committee. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Cathy Ann Buge
Higgins, a second year student at DePaul University, in the compilation of this Article.
1. 1 Kings 4:16 et. seq.
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HISTORIC PRESUMPTIONS
At common law, courts had little difficulty in determining
which parent was entitled to custody. The sex of the parent was
the sole criterion. A father had the right to custody of his child
unless he somehow abused that right.2 This right to custody in
favor of the father at times went to the extreme of allowing the
father to have custody when the child was still nurturing at the
mother's breast.' At common law, this preference in favor of the
father was based upon the presumption that it would benefit a
child to be in the care of his or her father because of the father's
natural and legal obligations to support and protect the child.4
In 1849, the Illinois Supreme Court discussed the existence of
this common law right of a father to his child in the case of Miner
v. Miner.5 But in Miner, the court noted that there was then a
statute in Illinois which authorized a court, when granting a di-
vorce, to make such order touching "the care, custody and sup-
port of the children, or any of them, as from the circumstances
of the parties and the nature of the case shall be fit, reasonable
and just."' Using this statute to show that the right of the father
is no longer absolute, the court gave custody to the mother.' How-
2. The King v. De Manneville, 102 Eng. Rep. 1054 (K.B. 1804).
3. Id.
4. See Comment, Custody and Control of Children, 5 FORDHAM L. REV. 460 (1936) which
states:
At early English common law the father, as of right, was entitled to the custody
of his minor children and at times his right was considered absolute, even when
its exercise was detrimental to the infant's welfare. . . . In the United States
at common law the father, because of his natural and legal obligations to sup-
port, protect and educate, was recognized as the natural guardian of the person
of his minor child. . . . [Ilt centered in the father primarily for the benefit of
the infant, the law presuming that it would be for the child's best interest to be
under the nurture and care of the father.
Id. at 461-62. See also Note, Reciprocity of Rights and Duties Between Parent and Child,
42 HARV. L. REV. 112, 112 n.2 (1928), quoting 1 SCHOULER, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION,
AND DOMESTic RELATIONS §752 (6th ed. 1921), which noted, "This right [to services], like
that of custody, rests upon the parental duty of maintenance, and furnishes some compen-
sation to the father for his own services rendered the child."
5. 11 Ill. 43 (1849).
6. Id. at 50.
7. The court reached the conclusion to leave custody with the mother first by making
a point that the father was the guilty party in the divorce. Then, the court noted that next
to the father's right was the mother's right and it is up to the chancery courts to look to
the best interests of the child. Id. at 49. The court noted that this child was a 7-or-8-year-
old female who would get daily care and supervision from a mother, but who would be
left with strangers during the father's working hours. Id. at 51.
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ever, the court in Miner went further than abolishing the father's
common law right to custody and established a presumption in
favor of the mother stating that:
[Ain infant of tender years is generally left with the mother,
(if no objection to her is shown to exist) even when the father is
without blame, merely because of his inability to bestow upon
it that tender care which nature requires, and which it is the
peculiar province of a mother to supply.'
Thus, Miner became the first expression of the "tender years
doctrine" in Illinois, creating a presumption in favor of the
mother.
The tender years doctrine thereafter became entwined in most
decisions awarding custody to mothers.' However, the courts that
awarded custody to mothers, utilizing the tender years doctrine,
frequently stated that the primary or controlling consideration for
determining custody was the best interests and welfare of the
children.' 0 It became apparent from reading the courts' opinions
that they were functioning from a preconceived notion that it was
in the best interests and welfare of young children to place them
in the custody of their mother unless the mother did something
to forfeit her right to have the children." This preference in favor
of mothers was frequently applied in spite of serious marital
misconduct."
The tender years doctrine may have validity presuming that
the mother is able to be a full-time parent. However, society
today has changed with an increasing equalization of the sexes,
both socially and economically. Women are now a large part of
today's work force,' 3 and those who need not work often engage
8. Id. at 49-50.
9. See, e.g., Nye v. Nye, 411 Ill. 408, 105 N.E.2d 300 (1952); Pierce v. Wade, 2 Ill.App.3d
717, 276 N.E.2d 744 (5th Dist. 1971); Melvin v. Melvin, 131 Ill.App.2d 1070, 269 N.E.2d
363 (5th Dist. 1971); Frees v. Frees, 99 Ill.App.2d 213, 240 N.E.2d 274 (1st Dist. 1968);
Dokos v. Dokos, 88 IUI.App.2d 330, 232 N.E.2d 508 (1st Dist. 1967); People v. Gaddis, 240
IlI.App. 508 (3d Dist. 1926); Pearson v. Pearson, 179 Ill.App. 127 (2d Dist. 1913); People
ex rel. Hickey v. Hickey, 86 Ill.App. 20 (1st Dist. 1899). See also Taylor, Child Custody
Problems in Illinois, 24 DEPAUL L. REv. 521, 525-27 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Taylor].
10. See, e.g., Nye v. Nye, 411 Ill. 408, 105 N.E.2d 300 (1952); Frees v. Frees, 99
IIl.App.2d 213, 240 N.E.2d 274 (1st Dist. 1968).
11. See Nickell v. Nickell, 112 Ill.App.2d 330, 250 N.E.2d 790 (2d Dist. 1969).
12. See, e.g., Nye v. Nye, 411 Ill. 408, 105 N.E.2d 300 (1952); Schulter v. Schulter, 5
IlI.App.3d 698, 283 N.E.2d 924 (2d Dist. 1972); Hockett v. Hockett, 128 Ill.App.2d 255,
261 N.E.2d 822 (5th Dist. 1974).
13. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ORGANIZATIONS FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH, AMERICA'S CHILDREN
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in social, cultural, or philanthropic activities which keep them
away from the home. Slowly, the courts have come to recognize
this change and its effect on family life.
ELIMINATION OF PRESUMPTIONS
In Patton v. Armstrong,"4 Illinois courts began to deviate
from the tender years doctrine. There the Fifth District Appellate
Court affirmed an award of custody of two children to their fa-
ther. The court reasoned that the presumption that the mother
was better able to care for the children was based on the assump-
tion that the mother would remain at home and care for the
children. Since the mother in this case worked, the court held
that the tender years doctrine was inapplicable. 5 In Marcus v.
Marcus" the First District further weakened the doctrine by rec-
ognizing the increasing equalization of the sexes, stating:
[1]t should be noted that there is today no inflexible rule which
requires that custody of the children, especially of tender age,
be vested in the mother. Equality of the sexes has entered this
field. The fact that a mother is fit is only one facet of the situa-
tion and, standing by itself, it does not authorize a denial of
custody to a father. 7
Finally in 1975, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth Dis-
trict openly rejected the tender years doctrine in Pratt v. Pratt,8
stating that as a result of the recent social and legal trends, the
presumption in favor of the mother could no longer be recog-
nized."
1976: A BICENTENNIAL ASSESSMENT 55-57 (1976). As of 1975, 47% of all women with children
under 18 were in the labor force. Id. at 53.
14. 16 Ill.App.3d 881, 307 N.E.2d 178 (5th Dist. 1974).
15. Similarly, in Plant v. Plant, 20 Ill.App.3d 5, 312 N.E. 2d 847 (5th Dist. 1974), the
court indirectly attenuated the doctrine in a support action. The court stated that with
the emancipation of women and the change in times, the view that support of a child was
exclusively the father's obligation is now outmoded. In the court's opinion, the support of
a child is a joint and several obligation of the mother and father with the amount and
source thereof to be determined on the basis of the needs of the child and the means and
capacity to produce income of the respective parents. For a further discussion of the
equalization of the sexes regarding child support obligations, see Comment, Child Sup-
port: His, Her, or Their Responsibility?, 25 DEPAuL. L. REv. 707 (1976).
16. 24 Ill.App.3d 401, 320 N.E.2d 581 (1st Dist. 1974).
17. Id. at 407, 320 N.E.2d at 585.
18. 29 Ill.App.3d 214, 330 N.E.2d 244 (4th Dist. 1975).
19. Id. at 216, 330 N.E.2d at 246, citing Marcus v. Marcus, 24 Ill.App.3d 401, 320
[Vol. 26:241
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Thus, with the courts having recognized the equality of sexes,
their task has become much more difficult in determining an
award of custody. Obviously, it was easier for a court to start with
a preference in favor of one parent. This would leave it to the non-
preferred parent to show why the preferred parent should not
have custody. With both parties on an equal footing, the custody
decision becomes more difficult. Consequently, it is important to
develop some criteria for determining which award of custody
would be in the child's best interest.20
RELEVANT FACTORS IN DETERMINING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD
Many cases discuss several influential factors considered rel-
evant in determining the best interests of the child. The primary
areas the courts generally look to are the parents' relative stabil-
ity, home environment, and emotional health."
N.E.2d 581 (1st Dist. 1974). In Drake v. Hohimer, 35 Ill.App.3d 529, 341 N.E.2d 399 (4th
Dist. 1976), the trial court awarded custody to the father after finding both parties were
fit. The mother on appeal argued that since both were fit, the court should have awarded
the mother custody because of the tender years doctrine. The father argued that to make
use of the tender years doctrine in favor of the mother would be in violation of the Illinois
Constitution article I, section 18 (1970), which forbids discrimination because of sex. The
appellate court side-stepped the constitutional issue. The court, instead, rejected the
tender years doctrine citing the Pratt case and went on to state, "The guiding star is and
must be at all times, the best interests of the child." Id. at 530, 341 N.E.2d at 400. It is
interesting that the court cited as authority for the "best interest" standard the Nye case,
which really was decided upon the tender years doctrine.
20. It should be noted that there is a significant difference between an award of custody
in the original divorce decree and the award of custody when one parent, after the divorce
decree is entered, seeks a change in custody. This changing of custody is possible because
according to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §19 (1975), the court has continuing jurisdiction to
modify custody decrees or orders. Although admittedly the standard for determining
custody should be solely the best interests of the minor child, the party seeking the change
of custody is not on an equal basis with the party who has custody under the divorce
decree. In Brady v. Brady, 26 Ill.App.3d 131, 324 N.E.2d 645 (5th Dist. 1975), it was held
that the party seeking the change in custody must show that there has been a substantial
change in circumstances since the previous custody award. Courts do not like to shift
children back and forth between contesting parents. Therefore, a change in custody is not
easy to accomplish unless the court is convinced that the change of circumstances, which
occurred after the original decree, requires that custody be changed for the best interest
of the child. The non-custodial parent merely improving his or her own situation after the
divorce has been held not to be sufficient change of circumstances to warrant a change of
custody. See Israel v. Israel, 8 Ill.App.2d 284, 131 N.E.2d 555 (2d Dist. 1956); Maupin v.
Maupin, 339 Ill.App. 484, 90 N.E.2d 234 (4th Dist. 1950).
21. See text accompanying notes 22-32 infra.
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Stability of the child's home has been considered an important
factor."2 Thus, Placing a child with a parent who would give a
more traditional background to the child as opposed to placing
the child with a parent with more experimental views, is a proper
basis for an award of custody." Similarly, a parent who places
great emphasis on family life and activities may be given custody
over the parent who frequently is away from home. 4 Courts also
have recognized the positive behavioral influence of a parent who
is a strict disciplinarian as opposed to a parent who allows the
children to do as they please. 5 Thus, it is obvious in custody
considerations that the courts tend to prefer a more traditional
environment.
This is further demonstrated by the courts' concern with the
emotional maturity of the custodial parent. The physical and
mental condition of both parents is a material issue considered
in awarding custody.2" Thus, where one parent's judgment was
held to be immature, it was proper to award custody to the other
parent. 7 It also has been considered materially relevant to a deci-
sion for a court to assess and evaluate the party's temperaments,
personalities and capabilities." Therefore, judicial concern with
several traditional factors provides a reliable yet subjective
means of furthering the search for just results in this sensitive
area.
However, there are a number of factors which the courts have
rejected as criteria for awarding custody. Past marital miscon-
duct is not a proper basis to deny an award of custody.2" The
relative wealth 3° and religion3 of the parents, while carrying some
22. Melvin v. Melvin, 131 II.App.2d 1070, 269 N.E.2d 363 (5th Dist. 1971).
23. See Anagnostopoulos v. Anagnostopoulos, 22 Ill.App.3d 479, 317 N.E.2d 681 (1st
Dist. 1974).
24. See, e.g., Patton v. Armstrong, 16 Ill.App.3d 881, 307 N.E.2d 178 (5th Dist. 1974);
Wilner v. Wilner, 131 IlI.App.2d 891, 266 N.E.2d 918 (3d Dist. 1971).
25. See, e.g., Wilner v. Wilner, 131 Ill.App.2d 891, 266 N.E.2d 918 (3d Dist. 1971).
26. "[Tjhe physical and mental condition of both parents is necessarily a material
issue in cases involving custody of a child." Marcus v. Marcus, 24 Ill.App.3d 401, 406, 320
N.E.2d 581, 584 (1st Dist. 1974).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 407, 320 N.E.2d at 585.
29. See Nye v. Nye, 411 Ill. 408, 105 N.E.2d 300 (1952); Huey v. Huey, 25 Ill.App.3d
20, 322 N.E.2d 560 (5th Dist. 1975).
30. People v. Schaedel, 340 Ill. 560, 173 N.E. 172 (1930).
31. Frank v. Frank, 26 Ill.App.2d 16, 167 N.E.2d 577 (1st Dist. 1960).
[Vol. 26:241
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weight with regard to the welfare of the child, are not exclusive
factors in discerning the best interest of a child. Furthermore, in
interracial marriages the awarding of custody to a particular par-
ent because the children are of his color is not considered a proper
basis for the court's decision.32
It is apparent that factors which the courts apply in determin-
ing the best interests of the minor child are quite subjective. The
one objective factor that the courts will consider, but refuse to be
bound by, is the preference of the child, if expressed.33 A four-
teen-year-old child is regarded as mature enough for the court
to give serious weight to his or her preference. 3' However, the
preferences of the child are valid only if they are based on what
the court considers reasons which relate to the child's best wel-
fare.35 Because of the discretionary weight the court may or may
not give to the child's preference, it likewise becomes a subjective
factor.
A further problem in contested custody cases stems from the
fact that a court of law is bound by formal rules of evidence and
judicial procedure. These formalities are awkward encumbrances
in a trial of this type. Rules of evidence usually require specifics,
such as dates, times, and places, and they generally filter out
testimony regarding opinions and feelings. Consequently, many
factors that would be relevant to determining the best interest of
the child are inadmissible .3 Young children whose futures are at
stake are not formal parties and, therefore, their activities may
be limited in the litigation. Are they to testify in the divorce
proceedings, and if so, are they to be treated like any other wit-
ness? How does a court, or will a court, obtain those facts neces-
sary to make the determination of which award of custody will
be in that child's best interest? This is an evolving area of law;
however, certain methods of obtaining the necessary facts are
becoming established.
32. Fountaine v. Fountaine, 9 Ill.App.2d 482, 133 N.E.2d 532 (1st Dist. 1956).
33. Strouse v. Strouse, 75 Ill.App.2d 362, 220 N.E.2d 485 (4th Dist. 1956).
34. See Patton v. Armstrong, 16 Ill.App.3d 998, 307 N.E.2d 351 (5th Dist. 1974); Marcus
v. Marcus, 109 Ill.App.2d 423, 248 N.E.2d 800 (1st Dist. 1969). See also ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 3, §136 (1975), which gives a minor above the age of fourteen, without a guardian, the
right to nominate a guardian subject to approval of the probate court.
35. Garland v. Garland, 19 IlI.App.3d 951, 312 N.E.2d 811 (1st Dist. 1974).
36. See text accompanying notes 83-86 infra. See also note 87 infra.
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DEVICES PRESENTLY UTILIZED
Social Service Report
In Illinois a court may order, on motion of the parties or on
its own motion, a social service investigation and report to assist
in establishing a factual basis for determining the best interest
of the child. The report is generally the product of an investiga-
tion of the parents and the child's home, their respective neigh-
bors, and the child's school teachers. In Cook County these inves-
tigations are conducted by the Department of Supportive Ser-
vices.37 Outside of Cook County, the courts most often order in-
vestigations by probation departments. These investigations are
not founded upon statutory authority; rather, the courts order
these investigations under their general equity powers.38 It is
peculiar to divorce cases that although the investigation and re-
port are ordered by the judge, he is not allowed to read the re-
port.39 This prohibition holds true even if the parties stipulate
that the court may read it.10 The rationale for prohibiting the
court from reading these reports is that they are basically hear-
say, contain the author's conclusions, and the qualifications of
the author may be questionable.4 The reason for this prohibition,
even if the parties agree, is that they cannot stipulate and bind
37. Until recently, this agency was known as the Court Service Division of the Cook
County Department of Public Aid.
38. See Harris v. Spencer, 86 Ill.App.2d 41, 229 N.E.2d 16 (5th Dist. 1967); Walter v.
Walter, 61 Ill.App.2d 476, 209 N.E.2d 691 (2d Dist. 1965).
It is interesting to note that in cases of adoption under the Adoption Act, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 4, §9.1-6 (1975), these types of investigations are provided for by statute and a written
report must be filed. The judge may read the report and disclose only those portions to
the petitioners which may be adverse to them. However, the statute specifically prohibits
the court from considering facts set forth in the report at a hearing unless the facts are
established by competent evidence. This is directly contrary to what the court may do
with a written report by an investigator in a divorce proceeding.
39. See Patton v. Armstrong, 6 Ill.App.3d 998, 286 N.E.2d 351 (5th Dist. 1972), wherein
it was stated:
[flt is improper for a judge to base a decision on reports or evidence that are
not available to the parties or in the record. . . . [The report] does not consti-
tute admissible evidence under Illinois rules of evidence . . . . We do not permit
courts to make decisions on such an unreliable basis.
Id. at 1000-01, 286 N.E.2d at 352-53.
40. See Scott v. Cohn, 134 Ill.App. 195 (1st Dist.), aff'd, 231 11. 556, 83 N.E. 191 (1907).
41. See Patton v. Armstrong, 6 III.App.3d 998, 1000, 286 N.E.2d 351, 353 (5th Dist.
1972).
[Vol. 26:241
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the minor child to have his destiny determined by less than credi-
ble evidence.42
It is valid, therefore, to question the purpose of ordering the
investigation and report in the first place. In spite of the restric-
tions on the use of these reports, they do serve a purpose. They
are made available to the attorneys for the benefit of the parties,
and therefore are a helpful discovery tool. They can lead to find-
ing new witnesses, including the author of the report. Although
the report cannot be read, this does not mean that the author of
the report cannot testify in court to facts he observed. Conse-
quently, the investigator may be called to testify by the party to
whom his testimony would be favorable. In addition, the report
of an impartial party may enlighten both parties to thoughts or
observations that they had not previously considered. This may
lead to settlement of the entire dispute by an agreement between
the parties.
Physical and Mental Examination
Another available tool in presenting facts to the court relating
to the best interests of children is the physical or mental exami-
nation.43 Under Supreme Court Rule 215,11 either party may seek
to have the other submit to a physical or mental examination if
the physical or mental condition of the party, or person in the
party's custody, is in controversy. This seeking of a court-ordered
examination extends even to submitting a child in a party's cus-
tody to an examination.45 The physician may be chosen by the
42. See Cohn v. Scott, 231 Ill. 556, 83 N.E. 191 (1907). See also In re Estate of LeCocq.
17 III.App.3d 1011, 309 N.E.2d 84 (3d Dist. 1974) in which it was held not to be reversible
error for the trial court to read an investigative report before modifying custody. The court
stated:
This report was received by the court pursuant to a stipulation of the parties.
Since this proceeding was undertaken by the Court without a jury and the
Court-appointed guardian ad litem did not object, we find no reversible error
in the procedure, particularly since there is no indication in the record that the
report was of any significance in the determination by the Court of the issues
in this case.
Id. at 1013-14, 309 N.E.2d at 86. (emphasis added)
The only apparent difference between this case where the report could be read and Cohn
v. Scott, where it could not, is the fact that in this case there was a guardian ad litem for
the child who did not object, so that the parties were not themselves stipulating away the
rights of the minor who was independently represented.
43. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §215 (1975).
44. Id.
45. Id. at §215(a).
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party who is seeking the examination. If the party who is to be
examined objects to that physician, then the party seeking the
examination may suggest others. For example, if a husband seek-
ing custody feels that his wife has some physical or mental prob-
lem that may adversely affect her obtaining custody, then he may
seek an order directing the wife to go to a physician of his choice.
Consequently, the husband will have the opportunity to present
the doctor at trial to present medical evidence that the husband
could not have otherwise obtained. This device also is useful
when a child has a particular mental or physical disorder that, if
proved, could affect a custody decision in favor of a parent who
may have a special skill in dealing with the child's problem.
There is no question that when a physician testifies under these
circumstances he is the witness for the party who calls him. This
is distinct and separate from an impartial medical examination.
The authority for an impartial medical examination is Supreme
Court Rule 215(d).11 Under this rule, the court prior to trial on
its own motion or on motion of either party, or on its own motion
during a trial, may order either or both parties to submit to a
physical or mental examination. This is conditioned upon the
court's finding that it will materially aid the just determination
of the case. 7 If this impartial examination is ordered by the court,
it is without cost to the parties. The parties also are removed from
the selection process of the physician. The Administrative Office
of Illinois Courts selects the physicians from a board of specialists
it maintains. In addition, either party may call the physician as
a witness at trial. However, written reports to the court and the
attorneys are required under both procedures."
Although the rule does not express it, and there is no precedent
in Illinois dealing with the question, it is reasonable to conclude
that the written reports have no probative value at trial. They
would be considered hearsay, just as in the case of investigative
reports by a state agency." Furthermore, the rule specifically
provides that either party may call the physician to testify and
that he may be cross-examined by the other party. 0 The implica-
46. Id. at §215(d).
47. Id.
48. Id. at §§215(c), 215(d)(3).
49. See text accompanying notes 37-42 supra.
50. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, §215(d)(4) (1975).
[Vol. 26:241
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tion is that if the report was considered admissible evidence such
a provision would be unnecessary. The supreme court rule was
originally intended to be used in personal injury cases.5 It has
only recently been employed in custody disputes. It truly is an
effective tool in informing the court of physical or mental factors
which might lead the court to a decision in the best interests of
the child, especially considering the fact that the physical and
mental condition of both parents is a material issue in custody
disputes.2 It also has been held that the court in a bench trial
may receive the opinion of a psychiatrist as to the fitness of the
parents. Although it may relate to the ultimate issue in a custody
case, the court is not required to accept the expert opinion, and
therefore the expert is not usurping the decision-making power of
the court.53
In-Chambers Interview
Another device employed by courts in gathering information
to assist in determining the best interests of the child is an in-
chambers interview with the minor child or children. Parents
normally want their child to suffer as little as possible during the
ordeal of a contested custody trial. The child, however, may have
information which is relevant to the custody issue that cannot be
introduced into evidence without the child's testimony. To lessen
the burden for the child, the parties can stipulate to have the
judge interview the child or children in the judge's chambers and
out of their presence.5' Prior to Oakes v. Oakes,55 in 1964, it was
considered improper for the court to speak to the children outside
the presence of the parties, even by agreement, and then base its
decision in part on secret information not contained in the re-
cord.5" The Oakes case overcame this objection by having the
court, upon motion of either party, state for the record the sub-
stantive parts of the child's statements. In 1975, the Illinois Ap-
51. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. l10A, §215 (Smith-Hurd 1968) (Committee Comments 199).
52. Marcus v. Marcus, 24 IIl.App.3d 401, 320 N.E.2d 581 (1st Dist. 1974). See also note
29 supra.
53. See Marcus v. Marcus, 24 Ill.App.3d 401, 406, 320 N.E.2d 581, 584 (1st Dist. 1974);
Filipello v. Filipello, 130 IIl.App.2d 1089, 268 N.E.2d 478 (1st Dist. 1971).
54. Oakes v. Oakes, 45 Ill.App.2d 387, 195 N.E.2d 840 (1st Dist. 1964).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Albert v. Albert, 340 Ill.App. 582, 92 N.E.2d 491 (1st Dist. 1950).
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pellate Court for the First District extended Oakes even further.
The court decided in Seniuta v. Seniuta,6 that a judge could in-
terview the children in chambers even over one of the parties'
objection. Therefore, the stipulation is no longer necessary for the
court to conduct the interview. The appellate court in the same
decision clearly stated, however, that the subject matter of the in-
chambers interview must be limited to matters related to custody
and the welfare of the child. The child's testimony concerning
other matters, i.e. grounds, property rights, etc., must be taken
in the presence of the parties and their counsel, unless waived by
the parties. 8
Conciliation Conference
Another aid to the court and the parties involved in contested
custody cases is a conciliation conference. The Circuit Court of
Cook County is the only circuit court in the state which has a
formal divorce conciliation service. The Presiding Judge of the
Divorce Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Robert L.
Hunter, created this service, exercising the statutory authority
granted to divorce courts to employ administrative aides.59 The
Divorce Conciliation Service has six full-time counselors trained
in the behavioral sciences. The counselors have no authority to
order the parties to do anything, and their recommendations can-
not be told to the court. If a judge refers a matter to the Concilia-
tion Service, the parties are assigned to one or two counselors.
These counselors interview the parties to the case, the children,
and any other persons who would have regular contact with a
child if custody or visitation rights were awarded to either party.
The counselors use their training and experience to attempt to
ease the hostilities between the litigants. The counselors will gen-
erally give their unbiased recommendation to the parties, and
then attempt to help the litigants see the problems involving
custody more clearly. This may be valuable because while the
parties are litigating their vision frequently is blurred by the emo-
tions of the fight. If the conciliation fails, the parties can then
return to the battleground of trial having lost nothing for their
effort except time.
57. 31 III.App.3d 408, 334 N.E.2d 261 (1st Dist. 1975).
58. Id. at 416, 334 N.E.2d at 267.
59. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, §30 (1975).
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Guardian Ad Litem
A relatively new tool which insures the court is fully informed
of the child's best interests is the appointment of a guardian ad
litem to represent the child. In Illinois, the appointment of a
guardian ad litem for children in custody disputes is in its early
stage. It is not utilized in every case. Although there are statutory
references for such appointment in other types of litigation in-
volving children,"° there is no statutory authority for the appoint-
ment of a guardian ad litem in contested custody disputes. The
appointments presently made are based upon the courts' inherent
and plenary jurisdiction over minors."' While procedures govern-
ing the guardian ad litem are emerging, there is no clear preced-
ent defining his duties and powers.
At present, the guardian ad litem has no power greater than
any other lawyer involved in the litigation. He is an officer of the
court, as are all lawyers. The guardian is subject to the constant
supervision of the court, and the court will protect the minor,
whether or not he effectively acts. 2 It is imperative that he take
an active role in the case because courts have held that a guardian
ad litem who perfunctorily files an answer and then abandons the
case fails to comprehend his duties as an officer of the court. 3 The
guardian must fully examine the case and determine the rights
of his ward, and the defenses their interests require, raise any
necessary defenses, and if necessary file a counter-complaint, or
even file or defend an appeal." He should not raise vexatious
issues or defenses not warranted by the law,65 and he cannot waive
any rights of his ward or stipulate to incompetent testimony.
That is not to say that the guardian cannot participate in settle-
60. Probate Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §338 (1975); Chancery Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
22, §5 (1975); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 217(2); Illinois Civil Practice Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
§54 (1975); Juvenile Court Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§704-705 (1975).
61. See Flynn v. Flynn, 283 Il1. 206, 220, 119 N.E. 304, 310 (1918), citing BLACKSTONE
COMMENTARIES*427.
62. See Gibbs v. Andrews, 299 I1. 510, 132 N.E. 544 (1921).
63. See Rom v. Gephart, 30 Ill.App.2d 199, 173 N.E.2d 828 (1st Dist. 1961); Baker v.
Baker, 202 Ill. 595, 67 N.E. 410 (1903).
64. See cases cited in note 65 infra. See Leonard v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 287
IIl.App. 397, 5 N.E.2d 282 (1st Dist. 1936); Sprague v. Beamer, 45 Ill.App. 17 (2d Dist.
1891).
65. Rom v. Gephart, 30 Ill.App.2d 199, 173 N.E.2d 828 (1st Dist. 1961); McCarthy v.
Cain, 301 Il. 534, 134 N.E. 62 (1922).
66. Cartwright v. Wise, 14 Ill. 417 (1853).
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ment negotiations. He can participate, but in doing so he cannot
bind the child without court approval since the court still main-
tains its supervision over both the child and the guardian ad
litem.17 In order for the guardian ad litem to examine the case and
present all the relevant facts concerning the child's welfare, it is
obvious that he can employ the same tools of litigation available
to the primary parties in the case. This would include the follow-
ing, some of which were previously discussed:
1. Participate or even initiate discovery:
a. Take depositions or be present while other per-
sons' depositions are being taken. 8
b. Require the production of documents, photo-
graphs or other tangible items."
c. Require that he be given access to inspect real
estate.0
d. Seek orders for physical or mental examination."
e. Seek to have the matter referred to the Divorce
Conciliation Service for possible counseling and media-
tion.
f. Seek to obtain an order for an in-home social in-
vestigation.
2. Participate at trial:
a. Call witnesses.
b. Cross-examine witnesses called by other parties.
c. Seek an in-chambers interview of the children by
the judge instead of direct testimony.
In addition, there has been much controversy over whether the
guardian ad litem should make a written report, and if he does,
whether the court should be permitted to read and consider it.
There is no precedent yet in Illinois concerning this question.
Those who argue against this practice say that it is improper for
the same reasons that reading an investigative report is prohib-
ited in custody cases."
The modern approach in dealing with this question recently
was discussed in an opinion rendered by the Massachusetts Su-
67. Pittsburgh, Cinn., Chgo. & St. L. Ry. v. Haley, 69 Ill.App. 64 (1st Dist. 1896), aff'd,
170 II. 610, 48 N.E. 920 (1897); Johnson v. McCann, 61 Ill.App. 110 (3d Dist. 1895).
68. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 110A, §§202-212 (1975).
69. Id. §214.
70. Id. This provision can be used as good authority for the guardians ad liten inspect-
ing the proposed residences of the child or children.
71. Id. §215.
72. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
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preme Judicial Court in the case of Gilmore v. Gilmore.7" Gilmore
involved a Massachusetts statute which permits the court to ap-
point a guardian ad litem and have him make a written report.74
In Gilmore the court affirmed the right of a court to read the
report and consider it together with the facts presented at trial.
However, in this case, the supreme judicial court reversed and
remanded the decision of the lower court because the trial court
had refused to permit a party to call the guardian ad litem as a
witness in order to cross-examine him as to his report. This is a
sound decision which appears to permit the court to receive a
wealth of helpful information while protecting the parties by sub-
jecting the guardian ad litem to the test of cross-examination.
The author believes that, notwithstanding the absence of statu-
tory authority in Illinois, a guardian ad litem should be required
to make reports, and that these reports should be read by the
court. Each party in a contested case files a pleading. These
pleadings contain allegations of facts constituting the parties'
theory of the case and the reasons that they are entitled to the
relief they are seeking. These pleadings have no probative value
in themselves, but at trial the parties may offer evidence to sup-
port them. If the guardian ad litem is to protect the interests of
the child, what pleading does he have before the court? What
outline does the court have before it in order to put in perspective
the facts or evidence that the guardian ad litem may adduce at
trial? The report of the guardian ad litem is that pleading. It has
no probative value as other pleadings have no probative value.
The court reads the parties' pleadings, and it should read the
report for the same reasons. All parties have copies of each other's
pleadings, and so should all parties have a copy of the guardian
ad litem's report. If the evidence at trial fails to substantiate the
statements or allegations contained in the report, then the con-
clusions or recommendations in the report should be given less
weight by the judge in the same manner as if parts of the com-
plaint or petition have not been substantiated fully. In summary,
the report is not offered as proof of the matters asserted in it, but
only as the guardian ad litem's position in the case subject to
proof. It is therefore not hearsay.
73. 341 N.E.2d 655 (Mass. 1976).
74. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 215, §56A (West 1975).
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In an adoption case, the Illinois Appellate Court inferentially
substantiated this theory. In Taylor v. Starkey,75 a guardian ad
litem filed a brief with the trial court which the parties referred
to as a report. It was his opinion that the defendant, the natural
father, was not unfit and depraved, and that the adoption should
be denied. The trial court took a contrary view and allowed the
adoption. In affirming the trial court, the appellate court stated,
"The court was not bound by the recommendations of the guard-
ian ad litem. It can be pointed out in at least one instance, the
report of the guardian ad litem did not agree with the evidence
presented at the hearing."78
CONCLUSION
The court can move only within a limited area to expand the
methods of getting before a judge all the facts he should consider
in making the difficult decision of placing a child. Progressive
legislation truly is the answer to this problem. The states of Ari-
zona," Colorado," Georgia,7" Kentucky,0 Montana' and Wash-
ington 2 have enacted far-sighted legislation in this area.83 They
provide for representation of the child by an attorney, although
they do not call it a guardian ad litem. They specifically set forth
75. 20 IlI.App.3d 630, 314 N.E.2d 620 (5th Dist. 1974).
76. Id. at 634, 314 N.E.2d at 623.
77. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§25-311 to 25-339 (Supp. 1973).
78. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§14-2-101 to 14-2-113, 14-10-101 to 14-10-133 (West 1973).
79. GA. CODE ANN. § 30-127 (Supp. 1976).
80. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§403.110-350 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
81. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§48.301-341 (Supp. 1975).
82. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§26.09.180 to 26.09.280 (Spec. Pamphlet 1976).
83. These states have enacted the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act or a substantially
similar version of the Act. This Act was written by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws. Its section on custody brings fresh air to child custody
trials. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DivoacE ACTS §402 (1971 version), provides in relevant part:
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the
child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
1. the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
2. the wishes of the child's parents as to his custody;
3. the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent
or parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly
affect the child's best interest;
4. the child's adjustment to his home, school and community; and
5. the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
6. The Court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that
does not affect his relationship to the child.
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sensitive standards to guide the court in determining the best
interest of the child. Essentially those standards include the
child's preference, the parents' preference, interaction and rela-
tionship of the child with other family members, the child's ad-
justment to his environment and the mental and physical condi-
tions of all persons involved. 4 In addition, these jurisdictions
provide for in-chambers interviews 5 and written reports to the
court from appointed investigators or advice from appointed pro-
fessional personnel, as long as copies are furnished to the par-
ties. 8 Michigan and Minnesota have the most progressive legisla-
tion in this area. Their statutes provide for the appointment of
guardians ad litem, and in addition, delineate nine relevant con-
siderations for determining the best interests of the child. 7
This movement by the aforementioned states in enacting this
legislation is an essential step towards effectively dealing with
custody disputes. It is a recognition that many of the elements
involved in determining the best interest of a child are subjective
and emotional and thus not communicable through testimony
relating specific facts. In Illinois, technical evidentiary objections
84. Id.
85. Id. § 404.
86. Id. §§404-405.
87. The relevant portions of MINN. STAT. ANN. §518.165 (Supp. 1976) provide as follows:
(a) The love, affection and other emotional ties existing between the compet-
ing parties and the child;
(b) The capacity and disposition of competing parties to give the child love,
affection and guidance and continuation of the educating and raising of the
child in its religion or creed, if any, or culture;
(c) The capacity and disposition of competing parties to provide the child with
food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted
under the laws of this state in lieu of medical care, and other material needs;
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment
and desirability of maintaining continuity;
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial
home;
(f) The cultural background of the child;
(g) The mental and physical health of the competing parties;
(h) The home, school and community record of the child;
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be
of sufficient age to express preference;
(j) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child
custody dispute.
The Michigan statute is essentially similar to Minnesota's. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§722-723 (Mason Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. §518.17 (Supp. 1976).
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can be used to exclude many important and necessary factors in
determining the best interest of the child. These elements should
not be barred from the courtroom merely because of evidentary
rules that require a witness to relate specific, objective facts. The
proper elimination of preference of one parent over the other in
Illinois makes the court's job in determining custody far more
difficult. The Illinois legislature should react to this problem by
enacting legislation that enables trial courts to be informed of all
the relevant factors in determining a child's best interest.
